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Abstract
In this paper, we consider a two-stage (sequential) game as introduced by Vickers (1985), Fershtman (1985),
Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987). This game models the situation where the owners of competing
firms manipulate their managers’ incentive contracts for strategic reasons. Instead of the sales volume as part of
these contracts, we introduce market share, besides profit, as a natural part of managers’ incentives. Then we
compare the results with those obtained for combinations of profits and sales volume, as well as for the classical
Cournot model. Concerning an n-firm oligopoly, and compared to the sales-delegation case, it appears that
owners put more emphasis on managerial profit-maximizing behavior, indicated by smaller weights attributed
to market share in managerial incentive contracts. Social welfare corresponding to the market share-delegation
case almost equals welfare associated with the sales-delegation case. However, its components differ. The case
of market share-delegation leads to a higher profitability of incumbent rivals and to a lower consumer surplus,
in comparison to the sales-delegation case. One may state that the owner’s strategic use of market share as a
managerial incentive leads to a (partial) shift of benefits from consumers to producers.
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1 Introduction
Traditional economic theories of direct competition use the highly simplified assumption that the single
aim of rivaling firms is profit maximization. However, in large companies, ownership and management are
separated, and managerial decision processes are rather complex. Already in the 1950s, Baumol (1958)
realized that managers may be driven by other motives than pure profit-maximization, and he suggested
a sales-maximization model as a more realistic alternative. Managerial economics, which became a new
sprout emerging from the tree of economics, focused on this very issue of managerial motives. By directly
estimating managers’ objectives, two early representatives of managerial economics, namely Hall (1967) and
Lackman and Craycroft (1974), supported the sales-maximization hypothesis empirically. In a similar vein,
market share may provide a crucial motive for managers. Peck (1988) reports the empirical findings of a
survey in corporate objectives among 1,000 American and 1,031 Japanese top managers. Increasing market
share ranks third in the American and second in the Japanese sub-sample, whereas return on investment is
first among American and third among Japanese top managers. Furthermore, the role of nonprofit incentives
is evident from empirical studies in the agency tradition, such as those of Jensen and Murphy (1990) and
Lambert, Larcker and Weigelt (1991) into managerial compensation practices. These studies reveal that
executive bonuses and salaries are associated with both firm size and profit level, with the size correlations
being the stronger of the two. Clearly, managerial compensation schemes point at the crucial fact that
managers’ behavior can be influenced or manipulated by owners in a principal-agent context.
The strategic use of managers’ incentive contracts in direct competition has been introduced in the 1980s
by the path-breaking papers of Vickers (1985), Fershtman (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas
(1987). These contributions offer a game-theoretic explanation for managers’ nonprofit-maximizing behavior.
These studies consider the separation of owners (principals) and managers (agents), and examine a two-stage
sequential game, where in the first stage (the ’contract stage’) the owner writes his manager’s incentive
contract, which is publicly announced, before competition evolves in the second stage. Concerning all these
principal-agent models, manager’s contract consists of a (linear) combination of profits and production
volume (we note that Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) use a combination of profits and
revenues, but this combination can be rewritten as a combination of profits and output volume). In the
consecutive stage (the ’market stage’), firms’ managers decide on market supply, using the utility function
directed by the contract, because their compensation depends on it. The two-stage game is solved by the
usual method of backward induction: knowing the Nash equilibrium at the market stage, owners can choose
the weights attributed to output volume in the incentive contract such that, given the rival’s contract, their
profit is maximized. This strategic manipulation by all owners of the incumbent firms leads to a so-called
subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE), concerning contracts’ weights attributed to output volumes.
These four papers led to fruitful consecutive studies in which researchers adopted the basic concept of these
delegation games in their examinations. For instance, Szymanski (1994) deals with managerial cost control
in a bargaining process with unions, Basu (1995) introduces an extra stage in the sequential game where the
owner decides to hire a manager or not and provides an interesting game-theoretic explanation for Stackelberg
leadership, and Ziss (2001) and Gonza´lez-Maestre and Lo´pez-Cun˜at (2001) examine the implications of
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strategic delegation for market structure by analyzing the conditions for endogenous or exogenous mergers.
So one could say that the study of delegation games is still enriched with several expansions and refinements.
However, all these authors assume that managers’ incentive contracts consist of a combination of profits and
(weighted) production levels. In the current paper, we offer a twofold contribution. First, we explore another
delegation game, with market share rather than sales delegation. Second, we generalize the mathematical
methodology used to analyze delegation games. Before we introduce our market share version of a delegation
game, we first discuss both contributions in greater detail.
Market share as part of manager’s contract
This paper deals with the introduction of a different nonprofit-maximizing objective of firms’ managers in the
Cournot oligopoly case, namely market share. We adopt the concept of a two-stage sequential game, where at
the contract stage firm’s owner writes his manager’s incentive contract, which consists of a linear combination
of profits and market share. Again, the owner’s objective is to manipulate his manager’s contract such that,
given the rival’s contract, his profit is maximized. This strategic delegation sounds very familiar, so first we
argue that market share, as part of the contract, may provide an interesting modification (and hopefully a
further enrichment) of the models of Vickers (1985), Fershtman (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas
(1987), and the delegation games that followed upon this set of pioneering studies. A first argument comes
from an empirical angle. The early study of Peck (1988) already pointed at the importance of managerial
preference for market share, and therefore justifies an examination of the implications of market share in
manager’s incentive contract. Since then, much anecdotal evidence about the importance of market share
motives emerged in the business press and management literature. A classic example is Jack Welch’s General
Electric, which publicly announced that its key objective is to be number one in all the markets in which
it operates. Another example is the recent and still ongoing price war between the large supermarkets in
the Netherlands, which was triggered by a decrease of the market share of Albert Heijn in the aftermath
of the Ahold accounting scandal and a disproportionate bonus deal with the new Chief Executive Officer –
the former IKEA top manager – Anders Moberg. The market shares of all involved rivals received (and still
receive) much attention of the media, which underlines market share as a status motive in direct competition.
A final example relates to media industries, where market share in terms of listeners (radio stations), readers
(newspaper dailies) and viewers (TV channels) are the key to success.
The fact that owners – and their managers – attach significant value to their market share in direct com-
petition, and therefore consider it to be an important indicator of managerial performance, seems to be
a ’natural’ aspect of human nature, as much evidence exists that many economic agents are interested in
their relative rather than their absolute performance. In modelling consumer behavior, for instance, status
motives have been used to describe the additional purpose of consuming a so-called positional good. For
example, Rauscher (1992) analyzes a ’status-game’ between two neighbors. In a similar vein, experimental
economics has produced support for this assumption of relative utility maximization – for example, in the
context of so-called ultimatum games (Gu¨th, Kliemt and Ockenfels (2003)). One could say that sales is
an absolute measure, because it does not involve rival’s market supply explicitly. However, market share,
taking into account competitor’s output performance, provides a relative indicator and can be seen as a
status motive in rivalry. In the finance literature, for example, the status-like hubris motive is found to be a
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main driver behind M&As (Ferna´ndez, Baixauli and Samuel (2003)). The fact that a firm is likely to keep
an eye on its rival’s performance speaks for the introduction of this relative indicator in a delegation game.
We examine the case of Cournot-quantity competition and compare our analytic results, such as the (equi-
librium) weight attributed to market share in a manager’s contract, the output corresponding with the
incentive equilibrium at the second stage of the game, firms’ equilibrium profits and social welfare, with the
results of the sales-delegation games in the tradition of Vickers (1985), Fershtman (1985), Fershtman and
Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987). Besides the consideration of the economic implications of market share as
part of managers’ incentive contracts, we will first reflect on the mathematical method to solve this two-stage
game.
Mathematical methodology
Despite the fact that the method to solve a two-stage sequential game is straightforward and rests on
backward induction, the introduction of market share in the contracts strongly complicates the mathematical
analysis in comparison with the sales-delegation case. The case of market share introduces a system of
analytically non-solvable equations at the market stage of the game, so we do not use our method just for
fun, but are forced to use more complicated analysis. The advantage of our method is its applicability to
general incentives in the contracts, because explicit expressions of profits and outputs concerning the Nash
equilibrium at the second stage of the game are not needed. Our method makes use of essential properties of
equilibrium profits and outputs, and also emphasizes the crucial requirements for the existence of a unique
Nash equilibrium at the second stage and a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium at the game’s contract
stage. To clarify the hurdles we have to take, we briefly run through the methodology of the well-known
sales-delegation case. There the Cournot-Nash equilibrium at the second stage of the game is clearly unique
and, by solving a system of linear equations, market supplies can be explicitly expressed as functions of the
weights of sales in managers’ incentive contracts. As a consequence, competitors’ profits can be expressed
relatively simply as a function of these weights so that the application of the principle of backward induction
– i.e., maximization of each profit function, given rivals’ weights in their contracts – is rather easy.
However, if market share is part of managers’ contracts, managers’ output decisions naturally depend on
their utility functions, consisting of a linear combination of profits and market share. Instead of linear
best-response curves in the sales-delegation case, we now have to deal with non-linear reaction curves at the
game’s market stage. The mathematical expressions of such reaction functions are rather complicated, which
can be determined by solving a third-degree equation, using Cardan’s method (see van Lier (2003)). Clearly,
the uniqueness of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the duopoly case (roughly speaking, the intersection
point of two reaction curves) may not be taken for granted, but has to be proved. Note that the existence
of more equilibria, at the second stage of the game, would strongly complicate the analysis of the contract
stage. We observe that existing game-theoretical uniqueness theorems are not applicable in our case, but
fortunately we are able to provide a uniqueness proof, using some essential properties of managers’ best-
response curves. However, expressing market supplies as explicit formulas, concerning the duopoly case, is
impossible, because it involves the solving of a system of two third-degree equations with different values for
the weights w1 and w2 in it (here wi denotes the weight attributed to market share in manager i’s contract).
Therefore, we have to resort to the Implicit Function Theorem to deduce the essential properties of the
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equilibrium quantities – in the duopoly case: q1(w1, w2) and q2(w1, w2), where qi is the quantity produced
by firm i – at the market stage of the game. We also lack explicit mathematical expressions for both firms’
profit levels, corresponding to two (differing) managerial contracts. Notwithstanding this complication, we
show that the first-order conditions
∂pi1
∂w1
= 0 and
∂pi2
∂w2
= 0 (here pii denotes firm i’s profit) for the profit
levels lead to two usable equations. To show that, given the contract of the rival’s manager, there only exists
one unique contract which maximizes one’s own profits (the best response at the contract stage), again
involves more mathematical refinements.
Naturally, we pay attention to the composition of the incentive contracts – i.e., the weights attributed
to market share, resulting from strategic delegation. Furthermore, we reflect on the analytic outcomes of
important economic indicators, such as market supply, profits of the incumbent rivals and social welfare. A
comparison with the results of standard Cournot and the sales (revenue) cases of Vickers (1985), Fershtman
(1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987), concerning Cournot-quantity competition, is obvious.
Concerning this paper, we restrict our examinations to firms with equally efficient production technologies,
reflected in equal (constant) marginal production costs c. Then, the use of symmetry allows us to solve the
weights (w) in the incentive contracts and the resulting market supplies (q) analytically, notwithstanding
the non-linearity of the final set of equations in w and q. We note that cost heterogeneity would involve
numerical methods, although the methodology, presented in this paper, would still stand up. In section 2
the model’s general framework is introduced, where we consider the market and contract stage of the game
successively. Section 3 deals with a comparison with the sales-delegation case; first we concern a duopoly
and then we briefly reflect on the n-firm Cournot case. Section 4 concludes the main text with an appraisal,
whereas Appendices A,B,C and D contain all proofs in detail.
2 The model
We consider a duopoly situation with inverse demand given by
p = max{0, 1−Q},
where p denotes price and Q = q1 + q2 is total market supply; here qi is firm i’s output. For both firms, the
cost of producing 1 unit equals c < 1. (Note that the model p′ = max{0, a − bQ′} can be transformed into
this model using p =
p′
a
, Q =
b
a
·Q′.)
We assume that each firm has one owner and one manager playing a two-stage delegation game.
In the first stage, the owners simultaneously offer their managers a contract based on profits and some
indicator measuring the manager’s performance. In this paper, the indicator will be market share. Thus,
for manager i his compensation has the form Ai +BiUi, where Ai represents his fixed salary, BiUi equals a
performance-related bonus, Bi > 0 and
Ui =
{
pii + wi
qi
Q
if pii ≥ 0
0 if pii < 0,
with wi ≥ 0. After the weight (or contract) wi has been chosen, it is publicly announced.
In the second stage, the managers, knowing all the contracts, simultaneously choose their firms’ output.
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In the first stage, the owner of firm i will try to choose the weight wi in order to maximize his profits
pii = qi(1− c−Q), whereas his manager (knowing all the weights) chooses qi in order to maximize
Ui = qi(1− c−Q) + wi qi
Q
.
In the next two subsections, in order to obtain a subgame-perfect equilibrium, the method of backward
induction is employed to solve this delegation game. First, we determine for each pair of weights, w1 and w2,
the unique equilibrium
(
q1(w1, w2), q2(w1, w2)
)
of the corresponding ’market game’. Since the owners can
anticipate these quantities, we subsequently determine the unique symmetric equilibrium of the ’contract
game’ where the payoff for owner i is equal to his profits corresponding to the quantities q1(w1, w2) and
q2(w1, w2).
2.1 The market stage
After the weights w1 and w2 are chosen in the first stage, the managers – knowing these weights – play the
corresponding market game, where the i-th manager chooses a quantity qi ∈ [0, 1] and where his utility is
equal to
Ui(q1, q2) =
{
qi(1− c−Q) + wi qi
Q
if 0 < Q ≤ 1− c
0 if Q = 0 or Q > 1− c.
Note that this utility function is discontinuous at 0, which makes it impossible to apply the well-known
results concerning the existence of equilibria. Instead we will establish the uniqueness of the (relevant)
equilibrium by carefully considering the reaction curves of the players. Clearly, the market game has at least
one equilibrium (q1, q2) satisfying Q > 1 − c, which implies that profits are negative and that manager’s
utility equals zero. For obvious reasons, such equilibria will play no role in our analysis.
Now let (q∗1 , q
∗
2) be a Nash-Cournot equilibrium of the market game corresponding to a pair (w1, w2). Since
choosing the quantity 12 (1−c) is the optimal reaction if the opponent produces nothing and choosing nothing
is not optimal against 12 (1 − c), q∗1 > 0 and q∗2 > 0. Furthermore, q∗1 and q∗2 satisfy the following system of
equations: 

1− c− 2q1 − q2 + w1 q2
Q2
= 0
1− c− q1 − 2q2 + w2 q1
Q2
= 0.
(1)
In order to show that this system has a unique solution, in Appendix A, we prove that the second equation of
this system corresponds, for fixed w2 > 0, to a (reaction) curve R2 representing the graph of a differentiable,
concave function, say f (of q1). Furthermore, we will describe the behavior of the graph of f at the points
A, B and C (as represented in Figure 1). Note that the term reaction curve is somewhat misleading here.
Only that part of the curve below the line Q = 1 − c can be seen as a reaction curve. At first instance,
however, the inequality Q < 1− c will be left out consideration.
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q1
q2
C
R2
A
B
q1 = q2
FIGURE 1 One of the reaction curves at the market stage
LEMMA 1 The second equation of system (1) corresponds, for fixed w2 > 0, to a reaction curve repre-
senting the graph of a differentiable, concave function (of q1).
Similarly, the first equation of system (1) corresponds, for fixed w1 > 0, to a reaction curve R1 representing
the graph of a differentiable, concave function, say h (of q2). However, a part of this reaction curve is also
the graph of a differentiable concave function, say g of q1. In the following figure the graph of this function
g is represented (for the case w1 ≤ w2).
q1
q2
C
A
B
q1 = q2
f
g
C′
B′
qB′
S
FIGURE 2 Unique intersection of both reaction curves
In order to prove this, we note that, according to Appendix A, for qB′ < q2 < qC′ ,
− 12 = h′(qC′) < h′(q2) < h′(qB′) = −
1
2 + w1/4q2B′
.
So on the interval [qB′ , qC′ ] the function h is invertible. If g = h
−1, then for 0 < q1 < qB′
−2 = g′(0) > g′(q1) > g′(qB′) = −2− w1
4q2B′
.
The foregoing will be used to prove the following result.
LEMMA 2 The system (1) has a unique solution.
PROOF We will prove that the graphs of the functions f and h intersect in precisely one point.
(a) We consider the function d = g − f (of q1) on the interval [0, qB′ ]. For 0 < q1 < qB′ ,
d′(q1) = g
′(q1)− f ′(q1) < −2−
(− 12) = −1 12 < 0.
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Since d(0) = g(0)− f(0) > 0 and d(qB′) = g(qB′)− f(qB′) < 0, the graphs of the functions g and f intersect
once.
(b) Next we restrict the analysis to the set of points (q1, q2) satisfying q2 ≥ q1 ≥ 0 and q1 ≤ qB′ . On this
set the graph of the function h coincides with the graph of the function g. So, according to part (a), the
graphs of the functions h and f intersect once on this set.
(c) Finally, we restrict the analysis to the set of points (q1, q2) satisfying 0 ≤ q2 < q1 or q1 > qB′ . Now
let ` be the tangent to the graph of the function h at the point B′. The slope of the line ` is equal to
−2− w1
4q2B′
< −2. Hence, this tangent is below the line between the points C and S (see Figure 2). Since the
the function f is concave, its graph is above this line. Since the function h is concave, its graph is at the
left-hand side of the tangent `. This proves that the graphs of the functions h and f do not intersect on the
set under consideration. /
Next we are going to investigate those solutions of system (1) implying total market supply less than 1− c.
Note that this condition was not taken into consideration until now. So for a given pair (w1, w2) of contracts,
let (q∗1 , q
∗
2) be the unique solution of system (1) satisfying Q
∗ < 1 − c. As is shown in the proof of Lemma
2, it holds that
• q∗1 > 0 and q∗2 > 0
• given q∗i , manager j’s marginal utility is zero only at q∗j , whereas the marginal utility switches sign at
q∗j – that is, q
∗
j is the unique optimal reaction against q
∗
i .
This proves that (q∗1 , q
∗
2) is the unique equilibrium of the relevant market game. Hence,
THEOREM 1 If for a pair of contracts the unique solution of system (1) implies a total market supply
less than 1− c, then this solution corresponds to the unique equilibrium of the market game.
2.2 The contract stage
In this phase of the game, each owner has to choose the weight in the manager’s contract. Since for any
relevant choice of weight combinations, the corresponding market game has a unique equilibrium, the owners
– who want to maximize their profits – will anticipate this equilibrium. We will show that this situation, which
can be modelled as a ’contract game’, possesses a unique symmetric equilibrium – that is, an equilibrium
where both owners choose the same weight, say w∗. Subsequently, the managers choose the same quantity,
say q∗, in their market game.
More formally, owner i chooses the weight wi in order to maximize his profits pii(w1, w2) given the quantities
chosen in the market game. In order to describe these quantities, we note that given wi, owner j can always
obtain a positive profit by choosing wj = 0. In that situation his manager’s utility function coincides with
the one in the classical Cournot game. Hence, his manager’s reaction curve is the line segment between the
points (q1, q2) = (0, 1− c) and ( 12 (1− c), 0). Since the equilibrium of the market game lies on this line, this
implies that total market supply is strictly less than 1− c (note that (0, 1− c) is not an equilibrium). Since
the owners can guarantee themselves a positive profit, we may assume that an equilibrium (w1, w2) of the
contract game implies a total market supply less than 1 − c. So according to Theorem 1, the equilibrium(
q1(w1, w2), q2(w1, w2)
)
is the unique solution of the system (1), whereas
pii(w1, w2) = qi(w1, w2)[(1− c)− q1(w1, w2)− q2(w1, w2)].
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In Appendix B we show that the functions q1 and q2 possess continuous partial derivatives with respect to
w1 and w2.
In order to find the optimal reaction of owner 1 against a fixed weight w2 chosen by his opponent, we consider
the first-order condition
∂pi1
∂w1
= 0⇐⇒ ∂q1
∂w1
[(1− c)−Q− q1]− q1 ∂q2
∂w1
= 0. (2)
By implicitly differentiating (both sides of) the second equation of system (1) with respect to w1, we obtain
− ∂q1
∂w1
− 2 ∂q2
∂w1
+ w2
Q2
∂q1
∂w1
− 2q1Q
(
∂q1
∂w1
+
∂q2
∂w1
)
Q4
= 0
or
∂q1
∂w1
[
−1 + w2Q− 2q1
Q3
]
+
∂q2
∂w1
[
−2− 2w2 q1
Q3
]
= 0.
In combination with (2) this can be summarized as

 1− c−Q− q1 −q1
−1 + w2Q− 2q1
Q3
−2− 2w2 q1
Q3




∂q1
∂w1
∂q2
∂w1

 = [ 0
0
]
.
Since
∂q1
∂w1
> 0 (see Appendix B), the determinant of the coefficient matrix of this system must be zero.
Using the problem’s symmetry, we will suppose that w1 = w2 = w
∗. Then, however, it holds for the solution
(q1, q2) of the system (1) that q1 = q2 = q
∗.
Now the fact that the determinant is zero, leads to
(1− c− 3q∗)(−2− 2w∗ 1
8(q∗)2
)− q∗ = 0⇐⇒ −2(1− c) + 5q∗ − (1− c)w∗ 1
4(q∗)2
+ 3w∗
1
4q∗
= 0,
whereas (1) implies that
1− c− 3q∗ + w∗ 1
4q∗
= 0.
Combination of these two equations gives 14(q∗)2 − 8q∗(1− c) + (1− c)2 = 0, so that
q∗ =
4 +
√
2
14
(1− c) and w∗ = 10
√
2− 2
49
(1− c)2.
In order to prove that (w∗, w∗) is an equilibrium of the contract game, we show in Appendix C that
∂pi1
∂w1
(w1, w
∗)


> 0 if w1 < w
∗
= 0 if w1 = w
∗
< 0 if w1 > w
∗.
In the remainder of this section, we will illustrate this property in a more intuitive way.
If owner 1 maximizes his profits, given the weight w2, in fact he maximizes pi1 = q1(1 − c − Q) subject to
the restriction 1 − c − q1 − 2q2 + w2 q1
Q2
= 0 (which corresponds to the reaction curve R2 of manager 2).
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Geometrically, this situation can be analyzed by considering the level curves of the profit function pi1. A
typical level curve is represented in Figure 3.
q1
q2
R2
1− c
1− c
1
2 (1− c)
1
2 (1− c)
FIGURE 3 A typical iso-profit curve
Note that each level curve corresponds to a curve with the top lying on manager 1’s reaction curve in the
classical Cournot situation. Furthermore, the level curves move downwards if the level increases. Obviously,
the (unique) best reaction of owner 1 corresponds with the level curve that touches the reaction curve R2
once.
The results obtained in this section are summarized in the following theorem.
THEOREM 2 In the symmetric subgame-perfect equilibrium of the delegation game, the market supply,
the profits and the weight are, respectively,
q =
4 +
√
2
14
(1− c), pi = 10−
√
2
98
(1− c)2 and w = 10
√
2− 2
49
(1− c)2.
3 A comparison with other models
For the sake of convenience, we will refer to the classical Cournot (textbook) case without strategic delegation
as the no-delegation case. The delegation models of Vickers (1985), Fershtman (1985), Fershtman and Judd
(1987) and Sklivas (1987), which (in essence) all deal with production volume as part of managers’ incentive
contracts, will be called the sales-delegation cases, whereas this paper’s model will be briefly referred to as the
market share-delegation case. First, we reflect on a duopoly and compare the outcomes of the market share-
delegation case with the two other cases. We are of opinion that the duopolistic market structure reveals all
essential differences between these models. To highlight the differences, we distinguish the composition of
incentive contracts, profitability of incumbent rivals, and market supply and social welfare.
Table 1 summarizes all important indicators, concerning the three cases. The results pertaining to the sales-
delegation come from Vickers (1985) and are adapted to our normalized model (Vickers uses p = A − Q;
our model uses p = 1−Q). The weights in the contracts, total market supply, profits and social welfare are
indicated with w, Q, pi and SW respectively (concerning all expressions, c equals marginal production costs
on a scale from 0 to 1). Furthermore, the subscripts m and s refer to the market share-delegation case and
the sales-delegation case respectively.
10
model parameter
w Q pi SW
no-delegation 0 23 (1− c) 19 (1− c)2 49 (1− c)2
sales-delegation 15 (1− c) 45 (1− c) 225 (1− c)2 1225 (1− c)2
market share-delegation ≈ 0.25(1− c)2 ≈ 0.77(1− c) ≈ 0.09(1− c)2 ≈ 0.47(1− c)2
TABLE 1 Essentials of the duopoly case
Composition of incentive contracts
Each incentive contract is composed of a linear combination of the profit pi and a non-profit indicator, such
as production volume or market share. Therefore, the weights w reveal the owners’ emphasis on nonprofit-
maximizing managerial behavior in a strategic context. Because the weight attributed to profit is always 1
in our models, the smaller contracts’ weights attributed to non-profit indicators are, the more owners direct
their managers to pure profit-maximizing behavior. Clearly, the weight decreases w.r.t. increasing marginal
costs c, indicating that higher production costs are associated with owners’ manipulation towards more
pure profit-maximizing behavior. However, the weight wm corresponding to market share-delegation, falls
quadratically, whereas the sales-delegation weight ws decreases in a linear way. A graph of both weights as a
function of the marginal production costs c is presented in Figure 4. As indicated in the graph with a dotted
line, the weight wm only exceeds the weight ws for very efficient production technologies (to be precise: for
0 ≤ c < c∗ = 0.193). For most production processes (c ≥ c∗), market share-delegation is associated with
smaller weights attributed to market share in the incentive contracts. Hence, we may state that strategic
delegation with market share as a managerial incentive leads to more emphasis on profit-maximizing behavior.
Note that a case with moderate production efficiency, i.e. c = 0.5, corresponds with wm = 0.061 < ws =
0.100. Roughly speaking, in case of sales-delegation 10 percent of the incentive contract consists of production
volume, whereas only 6 percent is dedicated to the non-profit managerial indicator in case of market share-
delegation.
c
0.25
0.20
0.10
wm
ws
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
FIGURE 4 Comparison of the composition of incentive contracts in a duopoly
Profitability of incumbent competitors
Clearly, similar to the sales-delegation model, the incentive equilibrium of the market share-delegation case
corresponds with higher outputs than the classical Cournot-quantity equilibrium. The reason for this in-
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creased output is straightforward: each owner, by using incentives, directs his manager to more aggressive
behavior in order to force the competing manager to reduce his/her output. Because each owner acts in
the same way at the game’s contract stage, a subgame-perfect equilibrium is reached corresponding with
positive weights attributed to the manager’s performance indicator. Naturally, the increase of market sup-
ply in comparison to the no-delegation case leads to lower profits in the incentive equilibrium. However,
this paper’s analysis reveals that the indicator in the managers’ contracts matters. If pim, pis and pin equal
profit levels corresponding to the market share-delegation model, the sales-delegation case and the classical
no-delegation model, we have (from Table 1):
pis =
18
25pin = 0.72pin and pim =
90− 9√2
98
pin ≈ 0.789pin.
Apparently, the market share-delegation model is associated with to higher equilibrium profits than the
sales-delegation case and we have pim =
250− 25√2
196
pis ≈ 1.095pis. Reflecting on the contract’s composition,
we already observed that (in most cases, concerning production efficiency) market share-delegation leads
to more emphasis on managerial profit-maximizing behavior. The fact that pim is 9.5 percent higher than
equilibrium’s profitability concerning the sales-delegation model fits in completely.
It is clear that (in a duopoly), if both owners would agree to direct their managers to pure profit-maximizing
behavior, their profit would be larger in equilibrium. Fershtman (1985) already reflects on this issue concern-
ing the sales-delegation model and notes that ”..giving managers incentives that combine profits and sales
maximization may be the dominant strategy for the owners. Thus, even though owners wish to maximize
profit, the equilibrium in the market is such that in both firms managerial incentives are combined from prof-
its and sales maximization.” In fact, both the market share-delegation and the sales-delegation model deals
with a Prisoners’ Dilemma at the contract stage of the game, where the only Nash equilibrium corresponds
with incentive contracts which are composed of a profit and a nonprofit-maximizing indicator. In his plea
for the application of game theory to the issue of trust, van Witteloostuijn (2003) reflects on a Prisoners’
Dilemma, arising from a Bertrand duopoly game where incumbent rivals can set low or high prices. In this
context, he notes that ”untrustworthy behavior emphasizes competitive strategies of aggressive low prices,
whilst trustworthy behavior is associated with cooperative strategies of peaceful high-price setting”. In fact,
our delegation game deals with a competitive strategy. Suppose that both owners would agree on directing
their managers to pure profit-maximizing behavior, then such an equilibrium would not be stable in the
light of untrustworthy behavior. If one owner would violate the agreement, by giving his manager non-profit
incentives, the other owner would face a much lower profit. So the incentive equilibrium is very plausible in
a competitive context.
Market supply and social welfare
Let social welfare SW be defined as the sum of producer and consumer surplus. Then, in terms of our
normalized model, it can be expressed as SW (Q) =
∑n
i=1 pii + 0.5Q
2, where Q equals total market supply
with n firms involved. Because pii = qi(1− c−Q), we have SW (Q) = Q(1− c− 12Q). Clearly, for Q < 1− c,
SW is rising w.r.t. an increasing total market supply Q (social welfare would reach its optimum at Q = 1−c,
corresponding with the case of perfect competition). Because a duopoly leads to (Table 1)
Qn =
2
3 (1− c) < Qm =
4 +
√
2
7
(1− c) < Qs = 45 (1− c),
12
we have
SWn =
4
9 (1− c)2 < SWm =
19 + 3
√
2
49
(1− c)2 < SWs = 1225 (1− c)2.
Total market supply corresponding with the market share-delegation case exceeds total market output con-
cerning the no-delegation case, with SWm is 6.7 percent higher than SWn. Because SWs = 1.08 · SWn,
SWm and SWs are almost equal and we have
SWm =
25(19 + 3
√
2)
12 · 49 ≈ 0.99SWs.
Concerning a duopoly, social welfare corresponding to the market share-delegation case is only somewhat
lower in comparison to the sales-delegation case. The lower total market supply leads to a lower consumer
surplus, but this effect is almost completely compensated by a higher profitability of the incumbent com-
petitors. This result holds in general if an n-firm oligopoly is considered.
Results concerning the n-firm oligopoly
We highlighted the composition of incentive contracts, profitability of incumbent competitors, and social
welfare for the duopolistic market structure. In appendix D, the n-firm case is analyzed and (rather compli-
cated) expressions for the weights in the incentive contracts, market supply, profit levels and social welfare are
deduced at the incentive equilibrium. Concerning the duopoly case, we stated that the use of market share
as a managerial incentive leads to more emphasis on managerial profit-maximizing behavior by the owners,
in comparison to the sales-delegation case. Only for very efficient production technologies the opposite holds.
Table 2 reveals that this property still stands up if more than two rivals are involved. The weights ws and
wm are computed corresponding to (a) a very efficient production technology (marginal production costs are
c = 0.1 on a scale from 0 to 1) and (b) a moderate level of production efficiency (c = 0.5). Furthermore, we
computed the ’turning point’ c∗; for c > c∗, the weight ws in the sales incentive contract exceeds the weight
wm in the market share contract.
n c = 0.1 c = 0.1 c = 0.5 c = 0.5
ws wm c
∗ ws wm
2 0.180 0.201 0.193 0.100 0.062
3 0.180 0.201 0.194 0.100 0.062
4 0.159 0.173 0.174 0.088 0.053
5 0.138 0.147 0.153 0.077 0.045
6 0.122 0.126 0.135 0.068 0.039
7 0.108 0.110 0.120 0.060 0.034
TABLE 2 The n-firm oligopoly and the composition of contracts
The results of Table 2 speak for themselves. Note that the ’turning point’ c∗ even decreases as the number
of firms increases.
Table 3 contains some results concerning profit levels and social welfare for different n-firm oligopolies (for
n = 2, · · · , 7). Profits and welfare pertaining to the market share-delegation case are, again, compared to
the corresponding quantities of the no-delegation and the sales-delegation cases.
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n
pim
pin
× 100% pim
pis
× 100% SWm
SWn
× 100% SWm
SWs
× 100%
2 78.8 109.5 106.7 98.8
3 52.4 109.3 105.4 99.8
4 37.0 106.9 103.8 99.9
5 28.0 105.1 102.7 100.0
6 22.3 103.9 102.0 100.0
7 18.5 103.0 101.5 100.0
TABLE 3 The n-firm oligopoly, profitability and social welfare
Like in the sales-delegation case, the market share-delegation profits are much lower than the classical
Cournot profits and the quotient
pim
pin
decreases quickly if the number of incumbent rivals increases (this
also introduces a strong incentive for exogenous mergers, as Gonzalez-Maestre and Lopez-Cunat (2001) have
pointed out). However, the profit level corresponding to the market share-delegation case always exceeds
the sales-delegation profits. Table 3 reveals that this effect is more pronounced if the number of competing
firms is smaller.
Similar to the sales-delegation case, market share-delegation is beneficial for social welfare in comparison to
the no-delegation case. Strategic delegation triggers a higher total market supply at lower prices and the
effect of the increasing consumer surplus amply compensates the decrease of profitability. If we compare
social welfare, associated with both delegation cases, it strikes the eye that these quantities are almost equal
(only the duopoly case leads to a difference of 1 percent). However, the components, i.e. consumer surplus
and producer surplus, do differ. In comparison to the sales-delegation case, market share-delegation results
in a higher producer surplus and a lower consumer surplus, indicating that the benefits are shifted from the
demand to the supply side.
Conclusion
Like in the sales-delegation cases, concerning Cournot-quantity competition, we also find that each owner
wants to motivate his manager toward higher production levels by offering an incentive contract with some
weight attributed to market share. In fact, not surprisingly, each owner directs his manager to more aggressive
behavior in order to get competing managers to reduce their market supply. However, we find interesting
differences in comparison with the sales-delegation case. Both in the market share-delegation and the sales-
delegation cases, a higher-cost production process is associated with more emphasis on pure profit in incentive
contracts. But this effect occurs more strongly if market share-delegation is considered. Concerning an n-firm
oligopoly, and compared to the sales-delegation case, we find that owners put more emphasis on managerial
profit-maximizing behavior, indicated by smaller weights attributed to market share in managerial contracts.
Exceptions only occur if both firms control very efficient production technologies.
Naturally, more aggressive managerial behavior (directed by firms’ owners) leads to higher market supply
and higher welfare in comparison with the classical Cournot case. However, total market supply concerning
market share-delegation appears to be somewhat more restricted in comparison to the sales-delegation case,
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resulting in a lower consumer surplus. Concerning profits, the market share-delegation case leads to 9.5
percent higher duopoly profits in comparison with the sales-delegation case. We note that the property
of higher profitability still holds in case of an n-firm oligopoly, although the effect is less pronounced if a
larger number of competitors is involved. Interestingly, social welfare corresponding to the market share-
delegation case almost equals welfare concerning the sales-delegation case (only the duopoly case results in
a 1 percent difference). Although market share-delegation is associated with a decrease of consumer surplus,
profitability is higher in comparison to the sales-delegation case. Consumers’ disadvantages are (rather
exactly) compensated by producers’ extra profitabilities.
Future research can explore delegation games with, for instance, cost asymmetries, motivational differences
and Bertrand competition (cf. van Witteloostuijn (1998)). Given the current debate about pros and cons of
different renumeration schemes for top managers in the business world, such studies are important to shed
light on the competitive and societal consequences of different delegation regimes.
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1
LEMMA 1 The second equation of system (1) corresponds, for fixed w2 > 0, to a reaction curve repre-
senting the graph of a differentiable, concave function (of q1).
PROOF We give the proof for the case with w1 ≤ w2. The other case is similar.
(a) Let F (q1, q2) = (1− c)− q1 − 2q2 + w2 q1
Q2
. Since
∂F
∂q2
(q1, q2) = −2− 2w2 q1
Q3
< 0,
for any q1, the function q2 → F (q1, q2) is strictly decreasing. Now
F (q1, 0) = (1− c)− q1 + w2
q1
.
It is straightforward to show that F (q1, 0) > 0 for all 0 ≤ q1 < 12 (1 − c) +
√
1
4 (1− c)2 + w2. Furthermore,
for any q1 satisfying these inequalities, F (q1, q2) ↓ −∞ as q2 → ∞. Hence, for any q1 satisfying these
inequalities, the equation F (q1, q2) = 0 has precisely one solution, which will be denoted by
(
q1, f(q1)
)
.
This proves that, for fixed w2 > 0, the second equation of system (1) represents the graph q2 = f(q1) of the
function f . Note that, using Cardan’s method, an explicit expression for f(q1) can be deduced.
(b) According to the Implicit Function Theorem, the function f is differentiable and
f ′ =
dq2
dq1
= − ∂F
∂q1
/
∂F
∂q2
= − 12 +
w2q2
2Q3 + 2w2q1
.
(c) Hence, differentiating once again gives
f ′′ =
d2q2
dq21
=
[
2Q3 + 2w2q1
]
w2
dq2
dq1
− w2q2
[
6Q2
(
1 +
dq2
dq1
)
+ 2w2
]
[
2Q3 + 2w2q1
]2 .
So [
2Q3 + 2w2q1
]2
2w2
d2q2
dq21
=
[
Q3 + w2q1
]dq2
dq1
− q2
[
3Q2
(
1 +
dq2
dq1
)
+ w2
]
=
dq2
dq1
[
Q2(q1 − 2q2) + w2q1
]− 3q2Q2 − w2q2.
Using the fact that
dq2
dq1
=
−Q3 + w2(q2 − q1)
2Q3 + 2w2q1
,
leads to
2
[
Q3 + w2q1
]2
w2
d2q2
dq21
=
−Q3 + w2(q2 − q1)
2Q3 + 2w2q1
[
Q2(q1 − 2q2) + w2q1
]− 3q2Q2 − w2q2,
or
4
[
Q3 + w2q1
]3
w2
d2q2
dq21
= −Q5(q1 + 4q2)− 2w2Q3(2q2 + q1)− w22q1Q < 0.
Consequently, f ′′ =
d2q2
dq21
< 0. /
Hereafter we will determine for the points A, B and C on the reaction curve R2 (see Figure 1) the coordinates
and the slope of the tangents.
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At the point A, q1 = 0 so that (1− c)− 2q2 = 0. Hence, q2 = 12 (1− c). Furthermore,
f ′(0) =
dq2
dq1
(0) = − 12 +
w2q2
2Q3 + 2w2q1
= − 12 +
2w2
(1− c)2 .
At the point B, q1 = q2 = qB so that
(1− c)− qB − 2qB + w2 qB
(2qB)2
= 0⇐⇒ qB = 16 (1− c) + 16
√
(1− c)2 + 3w2.
Furthermore,
f ′(qB) =
dq2
dq1
(qB) = − 12 +
w2q2
2Q3 + 2w2q1
= − 1
2 + w2/4q2B
.
At the point C, q2 = 0, so that
(1− c)− qC + w2 qC
q2C
= 0⇐⇒ qC = 12 (1− c) + 12
√
(1− c)2 + 4w2.
Furthermore,
f ′(qC) =
dq2
dq1
(qC) = − 12 .
B The expression qi(w1, w2)
If
(
q1(w1, w2), q2(w1, w2)
)
is the Nash-Cournot equilibrium of the market game corresponding to the pair
(w1, w2), then q1(w1, w2) and q2(w1, w2) satisfy the following system:


=F1(q1,q2,w1,w2)︷ ︸︸ ︷
1− 2q1 − q2 − c+ w1 q2
Q2
= 0
1− q1 − 2q2 − c+ w2 q1
Q2︸ ︷︷ ︸
=F2(q1,q2,w1,w2)
= 0.
In order to apply the Implicit Function Theorem we determine
∂F1
∂q1
= −2− 2w1 q2
Q3
,
∂F1
∂q2
= −1 + w1 q1 − q2
Q3
,
∂F2
∂q1
= −1 + w2 q2 − q1
Q3
and
∂F2
∂q2
= −2− 2w2 q1
Q3
.
Hence,
JF = det


∂F1
∂q1
∂F1
∂q2
∂F2
∂q1
∂F2
∂q2

 = 3 + w1 3q2 + q1Q3 + w2 3q1 + q2Q3 + w1w2Q6 (q1 + q2)2 > 0.
So according to the Implicit Function Theorem, q1 = q1(w1, w2) and q2 = q2(w1, w2), where q1 and q2 have
continuous partial derivatives satisfying
∂q1
∂w1
= − 1
JF
det


∂F1
∂w1
∂F1
∂q2
∂F2
∂w1
∂F2
∂q2

 = − 1JF det


q2
Q2
∂F1
∂q2
0
∂F2
∂q2

 = − 1JF q2Q2 · [−2− 2w2 q1Q3 ] > 0.
and similarly for
∂q2
∂w1
,
∂q1
∂w2
and
∂q2
∂w2
.
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C A second-order condition for profit maximization
LEMMA 4 For given w2, the function w1 → pi1(w1, w2) has at most one extreme value on the interval
(0,∞).
PROOF In this proof, w2 is fixed. Note that choosing w1 is equivalent with shifting the dotted curve R1
or moving the intersection
(
q1(w1, w2), q2(w1, w2)
)
of the two curves over the curve R2.
q1
q2
R2
R1
1− c
1− c
1
2 (1− c)
1
2 (1− c)
FIGURE 5 Shifting the reaction curve of firm 1
As a consequence, q2 = f(q1) and
pi1(w1, w2) = q1(w1, w2)[(1− c)− q1(w1, w2)− f
(
q1(w1, w2)
)
],
where
(
q1, f(q1)
)
is the intersection of the curves R1 and R2. Hence,
∂pi1
∂w1
=
∂q1
∂w1
[
(1− c)− 2q1 − f(q1)− q1 · f ′(q1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=H(w1,w2)
]
.
Since
∂q1
∂w1
> 0, it is sufficient to prove that H(w1, w2) has at most one zero (note that w2 is fixed).
Observe that we are dealing with the expression
H(w1, w2) = (1− c)− 2q1(w1, w2)− f
(
q1(w1, w2)
)− q1(w1, w2) · f ′(q1(w1, w2)).
Hence,
∂H
∂w1
=
∂q1
∂w1
[−2− 2f ′(q1)− q1f ′′(q1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=L(q1)
]
.
Since
∂q1
∂w1
> 0, we will consider
L(q1) = −2− 2f ′(q1)− q1f ′′(q1)
= −2 + 4Q
9 + 4w2Q
6[3q1 − q2] +Q5[w2q1(q1 + 4q2)] + 2w22q1Q3[7q1 − 2q2] + w32q21 [5q1 − 3q2]
4
[
Q3 + w2q1
]3
< −2 + 4Q
9 + 12w2q1Q
6 + 4w2q1Q
6 + 14w22q
2
1Q
3 + 5w32q
3
1
4
[
Q3 + w2q1
]3
< −2 + 8Q
9 + 24w2q1Q
6 + 24w22q
2
1Q
3 + 8w32q
3
1
4
[
Q3 + w2q1
]3 = −2 + 8
[
Q3 + w2q1
]3
4
[
Q3 + w2q1
]3 = 0.
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This proves that
∂H
∂w1
< 0, or H(w1, w2) strictly decreases as w1 increases. /
D Market share: the general case
Manager i (knowing all the weights) chooses qi in order to maximize
Ui = qi(1−Q− c) + wi qi
Q
.
If (q∗1 , . . . , q
∗
n) is a Nash-Cournot equilibrium of the corresponding market game, then q
∗
1 , . . . , q
∗
n satisfy the
equation
1− 2qi −
∑
k 6=i
qk − c+ wiQ− qi
Q2
= 0⇐⇒ 1− qi −Q− c+ wiQ− qi
Q2
= 0 (3)
for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Since owner 1 chooses w1 in order to maximize his profit pi1, it follows that
∂pi1
∂w1
= 0⇐⇒ ∂q1
∂w1
(1−Q− c)− q1 ∂Q
∂w1
= 0. (4)
By implicitly differentiating (3) with respect to w1 we obtain for i = 2, 3, . . . , n
− ∂qi
∂w1
− ∂Q
∂w1
+ wi
Q2
(
∂Q
∂w1
− ∂qi
∂w1
)
− 2(Q− qi)Q ∂Q
∂w1
Q4
= 0
or
∂qi
∂w1
(−1− wi 1
Q2
)
+
∂Q
∂w1
(−1 + wi 2qi −Q
Q3
)
= 0.
Since (4) is equivalent with
∂q1
∂w1
(1−Q− q1 − c)− q1
∑
k 6=1
∂qk
∂w1
= 0,
the following equality holds

1−Q− q1 − c −q1 . . . −q1
−1 + w2 2q2 −Q
Q3
−2− w2 2
Q2
+ 2w2
q2
Q3
. . . −1 + w2 2q2 −Q
Q3
−1 + w3 2q3 −Q
Q3
−1 + w3 2q3 −Q
Q3
. . . −1 + w3 2q3 −Q
Q3
...
...
. . .
...
−1 + wn 2qn −Q
Q3
−1 + wn 2qn −Q
Q3
. . . −2− wn 2
Q2
+ 2wn
qn
Q3




∂q1
∂w1
∂q2
∂w1
...
∂qn
∂w1


=


0
0
...
0

 .
So the determinant of the foregoing coefficient matrix is zero.
Using the problem’s symmetry we will suppose that w1 = . . . = wn = w and that q1 = . . . = qn = q.
Then according to (3)
1− (n+ 1)q − c+ wnq − q
n2q2
= 0⇐⇒ w
n2q
=
(n+ 1)q + c− 1
n− 1 .
Furthermore,
−1 + wi 2qi −Q
Q3
=
−2q(n2 − n− 1) + c(2− n) + n− 2
n(n− 1)q
−2− wi 2
Q2
+ 2wi
qi
Q3
=
−2q(1 + 2n)− 2(c− 1)
nq
.and
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LEMMA 5 The determinant of the n× n matrix

a b b . . . b
c d c . . . c
c c d . . . c
...
...
...
. . .
...
c c c . . . d

 ,
where a, b, c, d are reals numbers, is equal to
(d− c)n−2[a(d+ (n− 2)c)− (n− 1)bc].
PROOF Note that

a b b . . . b
c d c . . . c
c c d . . . c
...
...
...
. . .
...
c c c . . . d

 =


a− b 0 0 . . . 0
0 d− c 0 . . . 0
0 0 d− c . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 . . . d− c

+


b
c
c
...
c

 [ 1 1 · · · 1 ]
=


a− b 0 . . . 0
0 d− c . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . d− c




I +


a− b 0 . . . 0
0 d− c . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . d− c


−1 
b
c
...
c

 [ 1 · · · 1 ]


=


a− b 0 . . . 0
0 d− c . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . d− c




I +


b
a− b
c
d− c
...
1
d− c


[ 1 · · · 1 ]


.
According to Lemma 3.1 in Szidarovszky and Yen (1995), the determinant of the matrix between curly
brackets is equal to
1 + [ 1 · · · 1 ]


b
a− b
c
d− c
...
1
d− c


= 1 +
b
a− b + (n− 1)
c
d− c .
Hence, the determinant in the Lemma is equal to
(a− b)(d− c)n−1[1 + b
a− b + (n− 1)
c
d− c
]
= (d− c)n−2[a(d+ (n− 2)c)− (n− 1)bc]. /
In our situation
a = 1− c− (n+ 1)q b = −q
c =
−2q(n2 − n− 1) + c(2− n) + n− 2
n(n− 1)q d =
−2q(1 + 2n)− 2(c− 1)
nq
.
We investigate two cases.
20
Case I If c = d, then
−2q(n2 − n− 1) + c(2− n) + n− 2
n− 1 = −2q(1 + 2n)− 2(c− 1)⇐⇒ q =
1
2n
(1− c).
This output would lead to a negative weight and therefore is irrelevant.
Case II If a
(
d+ (n− 2)c)− (n− 1)bc = 0, then
[1− (n+ 1)q − c]
[
−2q(1 + 2n)− 2(c− 1) + (n− 2)−2q(n
2 − n− 1) + c(2− n) + n− 2
n− 1
]
+ (n− 1)q−2q(n
2 − n− 1) + c(2− n) + n− 2
n− 1 = 0⇐⇒
[1− (n+ 1)q − c]
[
−2q(n3 − n2 + 1)+ 2(1− c)(n− 1) + (1− c)(n− 2)2]
− 2q2(n3 − 2n2 + 1)+ (n− 1)(n− 2)(1− c)q = 0.
This equation is a quadratic equation in q: it has the form Aq2 +Bq + C = 0, where
A = 2n4 − 2n3 + 2n2 + 2n,
B = (1− c)[−3n3 + 4n2 − 3n− 2],
C = (1− c)2(n2 − 2n+ 2).and
Note that
B2 − 4AC = (n− 1)2(n4 + 2n3 − 3n2 + 4n+ 4) > 0.
Hence,
q = (1− c)3n
3 − 4n2 + 3n+ 2 + (n− 1)√n4 + 2n3 − 3n2 + 4n+ 4
4n(n3 − n2 + n+ 1) .
The profit for each firm equals
pi = q(1− nq − c) = (1− c)2n
5 − 2n4 + 6n3 − 4n2 + n+ 6− (n− 1)3√n4 + 2n3 − 3n2 + 4n+ 4
8(n3 − n2 + n+ 1)2 .
Using
w
n2q
=
(n+ 1)q + c− 1
n− 1 ,
one can compute the weight, attributed to market share, in the incentive contracts:
w = (1− c)2
[−n7 + 7n6 − 18n5 + 18n4 − n3 − 13n2 + 4n+ 4
8(n− 1)(n3 − n2 + n+ 1)2
+
(n5 − 4n3 + 6n2 − n− 2)√n4 + 2n3 − 3n2 + 4n+ 4
8(n− 1)(n3 − n2 + n+ 1)2
]
.
For social welfare we obtain, using the expressions for pi and q,
SW = (1− c)2
[
7n6 − 16n5 + 26n4 − 8n3 − 5n2 + 16n+ 4
16(n3 − n2 + n+ 1)2
+
(n4 − n3 + n2 + n− 2)√n4 + 2n3 − 3n2 + 4n+ 4
16(n3 − n2 + n+ 1)2
]
.
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